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Abstract
How do people respond to others’ accidental behaviors? Reward and punishment for an accident might depend on the
actor’s intentions, or instead on the unintended outcomes she brings about. Yet, existing paradigms in experimental
economics do not include the possibility of accidental monetary allocations. We explore the balance of outcomes and
intentions in a two-player economic game where monetary allocations are made with a ‘‘trembling hand’’: that is, intentions
and outcomes are sometimes mismatched. Player 1 allocates $10 between herself and Player 2 by rolling one of three dice.
One die has a high probability of a selfish outcome, another has a high probability of a fair outcome, and the third has a
high probability of a generous outcome. Based on Player 1’s choice of die, Player 2 can infer her intentions. However, any of
the three die can yield any of the three possible outcomes. Player 2 is given the opportunity to respond to Player 1’s
allocation by adding to or subtracting from Player 1’s payoff. We find that Player 2’s responses are influenced substantially
by the accidental outcome of Player 1’s roll of the die. Comparison to control conditions suggests that in contexts where the
allocation is at least partially under the control of Player 1, Player 2 will punish Player 1 accountable for unintentional
negative outcomes. In addition, Player 2’s responses are influenced by Player 1’s intention. However, Player 2 tends to
modulate his responses substantially more for selfish intentions than for generous intentions. This novel economic game
provides new insight into the psychological mechanisms underlying social preferences for fairness and retribution.
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Introduction
Jon and Matt are brothers who share two traits: poor
marksmanship and a quick temper. Neither has committed a
crime before, but when a rival insults their family name, both
decide to take action. Jon pledges to kill the rival with a bullet to
the heart, but his shot misses and the rival is unharmed. Matt just
wants to spook the rival with a bullet over the shoulder, but he
accidentally hits the rival’s heart and kills him. In our home state
of Massachusetts, Jon can expect a sentence of roughly five to ten
years in prison for attempted murder with a firearm. Matt’s poor
marksmanship, however, earns him second degree murder—and a
mandatory life sentence.
Cases like this have drawn the attention of philosophers and
legal scholars [1,2], and for good reason. They highlight a tension
between two primary inputs into the process of moral judgment:
the assessment of outcome versus the assessment of intent. In the
case of Jon and Matt, the legal system assigns punishments in a
way that depends heavily on the outcomes of their behaviors,
despite their contradictory intentions. Are ordinary people’s
punishments of harms also strongly influenced by accidental
outcomes? And, how do people respond to ‘‘accidentally
generous’’ behavior? We investigated these questions in the
context of a two-player economic game.
Games in which one player makes an allocation of money and
another player rewards or punishes her by adding or subtracting
money depending on that allocation have become a standard
method of research in behavioral economics [3]. Yet while the
differential roles of outcome and intention in moral judgment has
long been a topic of psychological research [4,5,6,7,8,9,10], these
factors have typically been confounded in economic games: the
intended allocation and the actual allocation are usually identical.
Put simply, there is no opportunity for error. In such studies, it
cannot be known whether the response to an allocation is based on
the actual allocation, the intended allocation, or an interaction
between both factors.
Different economic models of responder behavior in allocator/
responder games have approached this problem in different ways.
According to one family of theories, we assign punishment and
reward on the basis of others’ intentions [11,12]. We refer to this
as the intention effect. On this model, negative responses to stingy
allocations are a response to the allocator’s stingy intent.
According to another family of theories, we assign reward and
punishment to establish an equitable distribution of resources
[13,14]. We refer to this as the distributional effect. On this model,
negative responses to stingy allocations are designed to equate the
final payoff between responder and allocator—thus, they depend
on outcomes alone, and not on intent. Of course, the intention
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 1 August 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 8 | e6699effect and distributional effect need not be mutually exclusive:
responses in allocator/responder games may be jointly determined
by both effects [15,16].
A handful of studies have tested these two models by
comparing situations in which money is allocated under full
control to situations in which money is allocated by an
independent mechanism, such as computerized random assign-
ment [17,18,19,20]. (Returning to the example of Matt the
shooter, this is perhaps analogous to asking, ‘‘Should Matt be
punished if an independent, random event happens to kill his rival?’’).
In other studies, experimenters have restricted the range of
allocations available to the allocator so that the allocation is
forced to be ‘stingy’ [9,21,22]. (This is perhaps analogous to
asking, ‘‘Should Matt be punished for killing the rival if Matt was
forced to pull the trigger?’’). These experiments find that
responders punish stingy allocations substantially less when the
‘allocator’ cannot control them. Such results demonstrate that
the distributional effect cannot fully account for responder
behavior in allocator/responder games: after all, distributions
are just as unequal when made by a computer, a human, or any
other mechanism. Something extra must explain the punish-
ment of controllable allocations. It has been argued that the
something extra is allocator intent; that is, the punishment of
stingy allocations is largely a response to stingy intentions
[9,17,22]. But, if it is intentions that matter, why would we
punish Matt more than Jon?
Evidence from psychological research [8,23,24] and law
suggests an important alternative account: perhaps responders
failed to punish in these studies not because the allocator lacked
the intention to make a stingy allocation, but rather because the
allocator had no control over the allocation whatsoever. In the real
world, we are required to judge individuals act with partial control
over their actions, but still bring about unintended consequenc-
es—individuals like Jon and Matt, who fire their shots with a
trembling hand. Why do we punish Matt severely for killing his
rival, even though he intended no physical harm? Possibly,
because the rival’s death was caused by a behavior under Matt’s
partial control: the firing of the shot. We refer to this model of
punishment as the ‘‘control’’ model: when people have at least
partial control over the outcomes of their behavior, they are held
accountable for those outcomes, whether specifically intended or
not.
Testing the reward and punishment of monetary allocations
under partial control requires an experimental paradigm where (1)
an allocator can attempt to choose between different allocation
amounts, (2) these choices exert partial, but imperfect control over
the actual outcome of the allocation, and (3) the responder has the
opportunity to respond to either the intended outcome, the actual
outcome, or some combination. We therefore integrated intentions
and outcomes into a single experimental condition, giving
respondents the opportunity to weight the importance of each;
we refer to this as a ‘‘trembling hand’’ game.
In this game, Player 1 allocates $10 between himself and Player
2 by choosing to roll one of three die: A, B or C. If she chooses Die
A and rolls a 1, 2, 3 or 4, she receives all $10 (a ‘‘selfish’’
allocation); if she rolls a 5 the money is divided $5/$5 (a ‘‘fair’’
allocation), and if she rolls a 6, Player 2 receives all the money (a
‘‘generous’’ allocation). Thus, Die A has a high probability of a
selfish allocation. By contrast, Die B has a high probability of a fair
outcome, and Die C has a high probability of a generous outcome.
When Player 1 chooses which die to roll, her intentions are
transparent: she will choose the die with the highest probability of
yielding the desired outcome (selfish, fair or generous). However,
any die could result in any of the three possible outcomes. Thus,
Player 1 has partial but imperfect control over the allocation of the
$10.
Player 2 is given the opportunity to respond to Player 1’s
allocation by attempting to increase or decrease Player 1’s
payoff by any amount up to $9. Both punishments and rewards
are costless to Player 2, having no effect on his payoff. Focusing
particularly on cases where Player 1’s intended allocation does
not match the outcome of her allocation (i.e., accidents), we can
assess the degree to which Player 2 assigns punishment and
reward on the basis of intent, outcome, or an interaction of both
factors.
In our experiment, as both players are aware, Player 2’s attempt
to reward or punish Player 1 is enforced by the experimenter in
only 1/10 of games, selected at random. Thus, Player 1 was able
to ‘get away’ with selfish allocations most of the time, without fear
of punishment. This feature was introduced to convince Player 2
that ‘fair’ or ‘generous’ allocations by Player 1 were the product of
genuinely prosocial motivations, rather than strategic attempts to
maximize reciprocated payoffs. (To our knowledge, this feature
has not been used in previous research).
What patterns of punishment and reward might we expect
from the responder in the trembling hand game? The intention
effect would produce responses determined exclusively by the
choice of die (i.e., Player 1’s intention), and not by accidental
outcomes of the roll. By contrast, the distributional effect and
the control effect would produce responses determined exclu-
sively by the outcome of the roll. In order to isolate the
distributional effect from the control effect, it is necessary to test
a case in which allocations are made with no control. In our ‘no
control’ condition, Player 1 was forced to roll a single die with
equal chances of yielding all three allocations, leaving the
allocation entirely to chance. The distributional model predicts
that the responder will continue to add or subtract in this
condition in order to equate outcomes, while the control model
predicts that the responder will not reward or punish because
the allocator lacks control. Thus, we can use the results of the no
control condition to estimate the effect of outcomes due to the
distributional model, and then test whether any additional effect
of outcomes is evident in the trembling hand condition, as
predicted uniquely by the control model.
We also included a ‘full control’ condition, in which Player 1
directly stipulates the amount of the allocation, without any
probabilistic error. This allows us to compare the response to fully
intentional allocations in the trembling hand game to the response
to fully intentional allocations in a more standard allocator/
responder paradigm, testing whether our results can be general-
ized to this large body of research.
Methods
Research was conducted with the approval of the Committee
on the Use of Human Subjects in Research at Harvard
University. Written consent was obtained from every subject
prior to testing.
Subjects were recruited through the online study pool at
Harvard University, and comprised both students and local non-
students. We report data from 30 subject pairs in each of the three
conditions, totaling 180 subjects. Data from two Player 2s were
excluded and replaced because matched Player 1 data was not
recorded, due to experimenter error. The subjects ranged from
ages 15 to 69.
All subjects were guaranteed a baseline payment of $5 for their
participation in the study, supplementing the money awarded
during the game. Subjects interacted anonymously with two
Trembling Hand Game
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2’s response could not affect Player 1’s payoff, data was collected
in advance from Player 1.
In the trembling hand condition, Player 2 was asked to commit
to a response for each of the nine possible combinations of die
chosen (Player 1’s intention) and actual allocation (the outcome)
before knowing which die Player 1 chose, or what she rolled.
Similarly, in the control conditions Player 2 was asked to commit
to a response in advance for each of the three possible outcomes.
This response was described by the experimenter in terms of
‘‘additions and subtractions’’, but never in terms of punishment
and reward, in order to minimize demand characteristics of the
game.
After Player 1’s behavior was known, the experimenter then
selected the appropriate response from Player 2’s advance
commitment (applying it with 1/10 probability and failing to
apply it with 9/10 probability). This method of data collection,
known as the strategy method, greatly increased our statistical
power and afforded the necessary sample size of responses to low-
probability events (e.g., generous intent paired with a stingy
outcome). The strategy method has been widely employed in
allocator-responder games, and two studies that directly compare
the strategy method to sequential responses report no significant
effect on responder behavior [25,26].
Player 2’s response had no effect on Player 2’s monetary
outcome—that is, punishment and reward were costless to
Player 2. This choice served to minimize the complexity of the
game: it was not necessary to introduce an additional source of
variability in Player 2’s payoff, to specify a ratio of cost to
reward/punishment, or to explain how costs would be
calculated in the 9/10 chance that reward and punishment
were not imposed by the experimenter. (In pilot testing, the
combination of these factors alongside the ‘‘trembling hand’’
technology appeared to make the game prohibitively complex
for some subjects).
Subjects were provided with a written description of the rules of
the game. They then participated in a structured interview with
the experimenter to ensure that they fully understood the rules of
the game. Player 2 used a worksheet to specify his advanced
commitments to all possible moves by Player 1. After each
selecting their own move, but before learning of the other player’s
move and the outcome of the game, both players filled out a brief
questionnaire. Written instructions, response sheets, debriefing
forms and a script of the structured interview are provided as
supplementary information (see Supplement S1).
Results
The Trembling Hand Condition
In the trembling hand condition, subjects in the role of Player 2
readily responded by adding or subtracting from Player 1’s payoff;
not a single subject left Player 1’s allocation unchanged for all nine
possible moves (three possible intentions6three possible out-
comes). Five subjects responded uniformly to the nine moves
(each awarding $9 for every possible move). Among the remaining
25 subjects, 11 assigned punishments and rewards on the basis of
the outcome alone—that is, they modified their responses
according to the three different outcomes, but not according to
the different intentions. No subjects assigned punishments and
rewards on the basis of intent alone. 14 subjects assigned
punishments and rewards on the basis of both outcome and
intention. The statistical analyses below include data from all 30
subjects. Mean responses to each possible outcome of the
experiment are charted in Figure 1.
In order to analyze the responses of all 30 Player 2s to the full
range of 9 possible moves by Player 1, we use a linear estimator
(OLS) with robust standard errors.
We include individual fixed effects since each subject
responds to every possible move by Player 1 (see Methods).
The dependent variable is Player 2’s response, ranging from 29
to 9, where a negative number indicates punishment and a
positive number reward. (Among 450 total responses, in 7 cases
Player 2 indicated an addition of $10 or subtraction of $10. We
changed those 7 responses to $9 and 2$9, respectively, for our
analysis.)
We use six independent variables to code for ‘‘stingy’’ outcome
(b1), ‘‘generous’’ outcome (b2), ‘‘stingy’’ intent (b3), ‘‘generous’’
intent (b4), the interaction between stingy outcome and stingy
intent (b5), and an interaction between generous outcome and
generous intent (b6). Thus, our regression treated fair intent
coupled with fair outcome as the baseline, with the constant term
expressing the mean response to this condition, and all other
coefficients expressed mean deviations from this response. The
dummy for each individual Player 2 is di. This model can be
represented as:
responseall~b0zLizb1 stingy outcomezb2 generous outcome
zb3 stingy intentzb4 generous intent
zb5 stingy : outcome X intent
zb6 generous : outcome X intentze
Regression analysis revealed a significant effect of stingy
outcome (b1=23.82, t=28.19, p,0.001) and of generous
outcome (b2=2.60, t=6.35, p,0.001), compared to fair
outcome. There was a significant effect of selfish intention
(b3=2.86, t=22.16, p,0.05) compared to fair intention, but
no significant effect of generous intention (b4=0.35, t=0.76,
p=0.45) and no significant interaction between intention and
outcome (stingy, b5=21.41, t=21.39, p=0.17; generous
b6=20.18, t=20.22, p=0.83). We then re-estimated the
model including only significant regressors (b1, b2, b3), all of
Figure 1. Summary of mean Player 2 responses in the
trembling hand condition to each combination of intention
(choice of die) and outcome (allocation amount).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006699.g001
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from the re-estimated model indicate that, on average, the
response to stingy intentions is $1. 4 7l e s st h a nt of a i ri n t e n t i o n s ,
and $4.29 less for stingy outcomes compared to fair outcomes.
The average response to generous outcomes is $2.54 greater
than for fair outcomes.
Just over half of subjects in the position of Player 1 in the
trembling hand condition chose to roll the selfish die (17/30), and
the remainder chose to roll the fair die. Subjects in the role of
Player 2 were asked to guess which die Player 1 would roll; 22 out
of 30 guessed the selfish die, and the remainder guessed the fair
die. Each Player 2 was asked to provide a written explanation of
their guess regarding Player 1’s choice of die, and 28/30 subjects
explained their prediction in terms of the most probable outcome
of the die. This suggests that nearly all subjects in the role of Player
2 understood the probabilistic weighting of the die, and the sense
in which the choice of die reflected the intended allocation of
Player 1.
To further safeguard against the possibility that some subjects
failed to consider intentions because they did not understand the
probabilistic weighting of the die, we performed a selective
analysis of the 14 subjects whose individual patterns of response
exhibited at least some sensitivity intentions—that is, whose
responses were not uniform across all outcomes. There was a
significant effect of stingy outcome (b1=24.18, t=25.75,
p,0.001) and of generous outcome (b2=2.44, t=4.23,
p,0.001). There was a significant effect of selfish intention
(b3=21.85, t=23.25, p,0.01), but no significant effect of
generous intention (b4=0.75, t=1.02, p=0.31), and a margin-
ally significant interaction between stingy intent and stingy
outcome (b5=23.03, t=21.91, p=0.059) but no significant
interaction between generous intention and generous outcome
(b6=20.39, t=20.29, p=0.77). Thus, even this subset of
subjects in the role of Player 2, who clearly assessed intentions,
exhibited substantial sensitivity to accidental outcomes.
In summary, the results of the trembling hand condition reveal
that Player 2 weighted the actual outcome of Player 1’s allocation
more heavily than Player 1’s intended allocation when deciding
whether to add to or subtract from Player 1’s payoff. Moreover,
only selfish intentions—and not generous intentions—exerted a
significant influence on Player 2’s behavior (comparing each to fair
intentions). The response to selfish outcomes was also substantially
larger than the response to generous outcomes (comparing each to
fair outcomes).
The No-control Condition
In order to test whether Player 2’s response was affected by the
allocation amount in the no-control condition, we used the
following OLS regression model with robust standard errors:
responseall~b0zLizb1 stingy outcome
zb2 generous outcomeze
where di is a dummy for each individual Player 2. Mean responses
are plotted in Figure 2a. Player 29s response was significantly lower
for ‘‘stingy’’ allocations compared to ‘‘fair’’ allocations:
b1=22.17, t=23.07, p,0.01. Player 2’s response was also
significantly higher for ‘‘generous’’ allocations compared to ‘‘fair’’
allocations: b2=2.53, t=3.46, p,0.001. (We assume that subjects
do not consider the allocations ‘‘stingy’’, ‘‘fair’’ or ‘‘generous’’
when they result from uncontrollable random assignment by the
roll of a single die; however, we maintain this nomenclature across
all three conditions for the sake of simplicity.)
These coefficients provide an estimate of the size of the
distributional effect on Player 2 responses. Can subjects’ reliance
on outcomes in the trembling hand condition be fully attributed to
this distributional effect observed in the no-control condition? In
order to provide a statistical test of this account, we conducted an
OLS regression that pooled data from both the no control and
trembling hand conditions. Specifically, we modeled the no
control condition as a baseline, and used a dummy variable to
identify the trembling hand condition. We included the three
significant regressors from the analysis of the trembling hand data
(stingy vs. fair outcome, generous vs. fair outcome, and stingy vs.
fair intent). Finally, we included two interaction dummy variables:
the interaction between condition (no control vs. trembling hand)
and stingy vs. fair outcome, and the interaction between condition
Figure 2. Mean Player 2 responses to ‘‘selfish’’, ‘‘fair’’ and ‘‘generous’’ allocations in (A) the no control condition and (B) the full
control condition.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006699.g002
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regressors of interest, testing whether subjects exhibit a sensitivity
to outcome in the trembling hand condition that exceeds the
baseline ‘distributional’ effect observed in the no control condition.
As above, we used robust standard errors and individual fixed
effects. This model can be represented as:
responseall~b0zLizb1 stingy outcome
zb2 generous outcomezb3 trembling hand
zb4 stingy outcome X trembling hand
zb5 generous outcome X trembling hand
zb6 stingy intentze
In this pooled regression, the interaction of condition with stingy
compared to fair outcome was significant (b4=22.12, t=22.75,
p,0.01). However, the interaction of condition with generous vs.
fair outcome was not significant (b5=0.01, t=0.01, p=.99).
(Regressors for stingy vs. fair allocation, generous vs. fair
allocation, and stingy vs. fair intention all remained significant in
this model). Thus, subjects were significantly more sensitive to
stingy outcomes when behaviors were performed under partial
control (in the trembling hand condition) compared to when
behaviors were performed without control (in the no control
condition). However, the response to generous outcomes per-
formed under partial control was not significantly greater than the
response to generous outcomes performed without control.
The coefficients derived from this pooled regression allow us to
assign estimated effects to each of the models considered above: an
intention effect, a distributional effect, and a control effect
(Table 1). The intention model explains subjects’ sensitivity to
stingy intentions in the trembling hand condition. The distribution
model explains subjects’ sensitivity to both stingy and generous
outcomes in the no control condition. The control model explains
subjects’ additional sensitivity to stingy outcomes in the trembling
hand condition, compared to the no control condition.
The Full Control Condition
In order to test whether Player 2’s response was affected by the
allocation amount in the full control condition, we used the
following OLS regression model with robust standard errors:
responseall~b0zLizb1 stingy outcomez
b2 generous outcomeze
where di is a dummy for each individual Player 2. Player 29s
response was significantly lower for stingy allocations compared to
fair allocations: b1=25.77, t=25.14, p,0.001. Player 2’s
response was also significantly higher for generous allocations
compared to fair allocations: b2=2.33, t=2.42, p,0.05. Mean
responses are charted in Figure 2b.
How well can the estimated coefficients derived from the
trembling hand and no-control models predict Player 2’s responses
in the full control condition? A direct comparison of estimated
versus observed effects is provided in Table 1. The total estimated
effect on Player 2’s response for a stingy vs. fair allocation
(intention effect+distributional effect+control effect) was 2$5.83,
and the actual difference in mean responses to stingy vs. fair
allocations in the full control condition was 2$5.77. The estimated
effect on Player 2’s response for generous vs. fair allocation
(distributional effect alone) was $2.53, and the actual difference in
mean responses to generous vs. fair allocations in the full control
condition was $2.33.
Discussion
This study investigates how information about outcomes and
intentions contribute to peoples’ responses to selfish, fair and
generous allocations of money. In particular, it explores the
balance of these factors in cases where people act with partial but
imperfect control over the outcome of their actions. Subjects
exhibited sensitivity to both outcomes and intentions in the
trembling hand condition, but outcomes tended to play a more
dominant role. On average, Player 2 punished Player 1 for bad
outcomes even when her intentions were good and rewarded
Player 1 for good outcomes even when her intentions were bad. A
strong ‘‘outcome bias’’ in punishment is evident in the law, and
has been noted in psychological studies [10,27,28,29], but recent
experiments employing allocator/responder games have empha-
sized a relatively greater role for intentions [9,17,22].
By comparing responses in the trembling hand condition to
responses in the no control condition, we estimated three different
hypothesized effects on Player 2’s response: an ‘‘intention effect’’
(stingy intentions are punished, generous intentions are rewarded),
a ‘‘distributional effect’’ (Player 2 adds or subtracts money from
Player 1 in order to equate their relative payoffs), and a ‘‘control
effect’’ (stingy outcomes are punished, and generous outcomes are
rewarded, but only when the outcomes are under at least partial
behavioral control). Empirical estimates of these effects are
summarized in Table 1. We found an intention effect for a stingy
choice of die, but an even larger control effect for a stingy
outcome. Neither of these effects was significant for generous
outcomes compared to fair outcomes, however. Finally, we found
a distributional effect comparing stingy to fair outcomes, and also
comparing fair to generous outcomes.
In summary, we find that people punish accidental outcomes in
allocator/responder games in a manner that cannot be explained
by a pure distributional effect (i.e. aversion to inequitable
outcomes). Below, we consider possible interpretations and
implications of these results. First, however, we address several
potential methodological concerns.
One possible explanation for the reliance on outcomes in the
trembling hand condition is that subjects did not understand the
probabilistic weighting of the three dice and therefore failed to
Table 1. Estimated vs. Observed Effects on Player 2
Responses.
Selfish vs. Fair Generous vs. Fair
Est. Intention Effect: 2$1.47 not sig.
Est. Distributional Effect: 2$2.17 $2.53
Est. Control Effect: 2$2.12 not sig.
Est. Full Effect (Sum): 2$5.83 $2.53
Observed Full Effect: 2$5.76 $2.33
Estimated change in Player 2 response to Player 1 contrast selfish to fair
allocations, and generous to fair allocations, based on three hypothesized
effects: the intention effect, the distributional effect, and the control effect.
Summing the hypothesized effects yields an estimate of Player 2’s response to
allocations made under full control (Est. Full Effect), and this can be compared
to Player 2’s actual response to allocations made under full control (Observed
Full Effect).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0006699.t001
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subjects in the role of Player 2 guessed that Player 1 would choose the
selfish die, one third guessed that Player 1 would choose the fair die,
and none guessed that Player 1 would choose the generous die.
Twenty-eight of 30 subjects specifically explained their prediction
about Player 1’s behavior by reference to the most probable outcome
of the die roll. This evidence suggests that nearly all subjects
understood the probabilistic weighting of the three dice to reveal
Player 1’s intention to bring about a particular outcome. Further-
more, accidental outcomes played a strong role even for the subset of
Player 2s whose responses clearly indicated a sensitivity to intentions.
A second possible explanation for the reliance on outcomes in the
trembling hand condition is that the range of punishments available
to Player2 wasrestricted inthe case offair andgenerous allocations.
When Player 1 was allocated $0, there was no money available for
Player 2 to subtract from Player 1—similarly, when Player 1 was
allocated $5, the maximum amount Player 2 could subtract was $5.
There are reasons to doubt that this feature of the game is
responsible for the dominance of outcomes in the trembling hand
condition, however. First, in the trembling hand condition not a
single subject subtracted the full $5 in response to a fair allocation,
even when Player 1 had selfish intentions, suggesting that this value
was not perceived as a limiting floor. Second, this ‘‘floor’’ on
punishment was consistent across all conditions, and thus cannot
explain the substantially different sensitivity to outcomes exhibited
in the no control condition compared to the trembling hand
condition. Third, in cases of selfish allocations, where the principal
difference between conditions was observed, the full range of
punishments and rewards was available to subjects.
Two additional methodological features of the present study are
worth noting, and point towards directions for future research. First,
punishment and reward were imposed by the recipient of Player 1’s
allocation, rather than a neutral third-party observer. Might Player
2’s responses be additionally sensitive to outcomes because he
experienced those outcomes himself? Possibly, but this hypothesized
effect should be consistent across the trembling hand condition and
no control condition—Player 1 directly experiences negative
outcomes in both. Therefore, it is unlikely to explain the additional
sensitivity to outcomes exhibited in the trembling hand condition,
from which the ‘‘control effect’’ is inferred. Second, in our study
reward and punishment were costless to Player 2. Although it is not
obvious ap r i o r iwhy adding a cost to punishment and reward would
selectivelyaffectPlayer2’ssensitivitytointentionsversusoutcomes,or
would selectively affect the trembling hand condition versus the no-
control condition, these are important issues for further investigation.
We now turn to possible interpretations and implications of our
findings, focusing on two issues in particular: (1) the distinction
between the ‘‘intention effect’’ and ‘‘control effect’’ on Player 2
responses, and (2) responses to stingy versus fair behaviors, as
compared to generous versus fair behaviors.
As noted above, past studies have compared experimental
conditions similar to our ‘‘no control’’ and ‘‘full control’’
conditions in order to assess the importance of allocator intentions
in determining punitive responses [9,17,18,19,20]. However, this
experimental approach conflates two possible determinants of
Player 2 responses: whether the allocation was intended by Player
1, and whether Player 1 had any control over the allocation. As we
demonstrate, when these effects are differentiated the factor of
controllability plays a role in determining Player 2 responses at
least as large as the factor of intent. This finding accords with past
psychological models implicating controllability as a key factor in
retribution [8,23,24]. It also underscores the importance of
experimental paradigms that combine intentions and outcomes
probabilistically in a single game.
Why might the factor of controllability matter? We conjecture
that sensitivity to behavioral control has value in repeated social
interactions. That is, it may be worthwhile to ‘teach a lesson’ to an
accidental harm-doer if you are likely to meet her again, but only if
she can exert at least partial control over the occurrence of future
harms in similar circumstances. Thus, in the context of repeated
play, teaching Player 1 that stingy outcomes will be punished only
makes sense if Player 1 can influence the probability of a stingy,
fair or generous outcome—as was the case the ‘‘trembling hand’’
condition, but not in the ‘‘no control’’ condition. Additionally, it
might be worthwhile to focus on the outcomes of another’s
behavior rather than their apparent intentions to protect against
the possibility of deception.
Of course, neither of these considerations are justified in our
experimental design: subjects interacted in an anonymous, one-
shot game with no possibility of deception. However, psychological
mechanisms underlying the control effect may have been shaped
in contexts where repeated interactions and the possibility of
deception were typical (this shaping may occur by individual
learning, cultural transmission, biological evolution, or some
combination). These psychological mechanisms may be automat-
ically deployed by subjects in our experimental setting even
though, strictly speaking, they are not justified.
In addition, it is notable that the intention effect and the control
effect were only operative when comparing selfish to fair behaviors,
and not when comparing fair to generous behaviors. Consistent
withthese findings, Offerman finds that punishment but not helping
behavior is driven by the attribution of intentions [20]. However,
Falk and colleagues find that intentions matter for both reward and
punishment [17]. Responses to fair versus generous offers remains
an important topic for further investigation.
Taking the results of the present study at face-value, why might
subjects not have exhibited an intention effect or control effect for
generous, versus fair, behavior? From a strictly quantitative,
economic perspective, this distinction is hard to explain. The
quantitative difference between stingy and fair behavior is just the
same as between fair and generous behavior: $5 less for the
allocator, and $5 more for the responder. However, psychological
evidence suggests important qualitative distinctions in the way that
people judge harmful versus helpful behaviors [24,30]. Again, we
conjecture that thisqualitative distinctionmaybe best understood in
the context of repeated, non-anonymous interactions. When an
individual (i.e. allocator) spontaneously engages in behavior
categorized by the responder as ‘‘harmful’’, the responder may
experience a strong motivation to incentivize a change in the
allocator’s future behavior, for instance by punishment. But, when
an individual spontaneously engages in behavior categorized by the
responder as ‘‘helpful’’, the responder may not experience any
motivation to incentivize a change in allocator behavior—‘‘if it ain’t
broke, don’t fix it’’. Possibly, both fair and generous allocations are
generically classified by the responder as sufficiently helpful, and
therefore do not motivate any incentivizing of allocator behavior.
Conclusion
A prodigious family of studies in behavioral economics has
investigated how people respond to selfish, fair and generous
allocations of resources, with the consistent finding that subjects
tend to diminish the payoffs of selfish allocators and increase the
payoffs of generous allocators. Relatively few studies have directly
investigated whether these responses are guided by a sensitivity to
the actual distribution of resources or the intended distribution of
resources, however. We test these factors in direct competition
within a single experimental condition. The results suggest that
responses to events under partial control are subject to a outcome
Trembling Hand Game
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 August 2009 | Volume 4 | Issue 8 | e6699bias: specifically, people punish ‘unlucky’ selfish allocations when
performed under partial control. This effect can be dissociated
from two different effects that we also confirm: an intention effect
(people punish stingy intent) and a pure distributional effect
(people attempt to equate final payoffs between players). These
findings open new directions for research into the psychological
mechanisms that underlie our social behavior.
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